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Abstract. Building cooperative security systems at the regional level is new practice in 
international politics. The concept of regional security partnership is presented here, and 
a descriptive model is applied to the study of the practice. Five cases of regional 
security partnership in Europe, East Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and the EU 
Neighbourhood are separately analyzed. Similarity and difference of the five cases are 
assessed in the concluding section, in which a comparative scheme is presented. 
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In international studies and practice, military alliance is viewed as the most 
important form of international cooperation created by governments in order to deal 
with threats to the security of the states. However, military alliance is only one of the 
forms of security cooperation among states. Data analysis proves that the number of 
military alliances and their size (i.e., the average number of members) have been 
changing over the last two centuries. Such a change has taken regular form, and such 
regularity has been explained by military alliance formation as dependent on system 
polarity and great power competition (Attinà, 2003a and 2004). System polarity 
influences security cooperation because, in addition to other factors, great powers 
encourage the formation of military alliances either to consolidate or change and subvert 
the existing political order. Security cooperation is influenced also by culture because 
values and norms about security, stability and peace make national governments 
inclined to change the forms of military cooperation in harmony with the prevailing 
values and norms.  
The analysis of current security cooperation presented in this paper takes 
into account both the current state of global power competition, that is, no polarized 
competition between the American hegemonic power and other great powers; and the 
predominant security culture of the current international system, that is, the emergence 
of cooperative and comprehensive security principles together with the traditional 
principles of national military doctrines based on the so-called security dilemma. More 
precisely, the paper calls attention on a specific form of security cooperation of current 
international politics, named regional security partnership, which is consistent with 
those characters of the world system. 
The paper is organized as it follows. The first two sections introduce the 
concept and model of regional security partnership. The other sections present the 
practice of regional security partnership in different areas of the contemporary world, 
namely in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Last section presents a preliminary comparative 
scheme for the analysis of the five cases here examined. 
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The study of regional security systems 
Interesting changes are taking place in the practice of security cooperation 
in contemporary international system. The most important feature of these changes is 
the simultaneous declining prominence of military alliances and rising importance of 
composite security frameworks at the region level. 
The number of defense pacts was very high in the after-World War Two 
period, but decreased ten years later because many states reacted to the pressure of the 
great powers to create opposite security alignments. Close to the present time, the 
number of defense pacts increased again but remained lower than that of the Cold War 
period. Furthermore, the percentage number of defense pact members on the total 
number of the states of the international system has been decreasing quite steadily for 
the last thirty-five years. As mentioned above, the current de-polarization of the 
international system has affected the cooperative behavior of the governments in the 
field of security. Briefly, they are less inclined to form military alliances. However, the 
average size of military alliances doubled after 1955, when the most intense period of 
the Cold War came to an end, and did not change much in the following years (Attinà, 
2003a and 2004). One can conclude that membership in large cooperation networks is 
preferred by the governments that want to increase their state security. The present 
study investigates whether such a preference is present also in other forms of security 
cooperation of the present phase of world politics of great power de-polarization and 
rising cooperative security culture. 
The assumption of this study is that security practices change over time. 
New measures are invented, experimented and gradually consolidated into security 
practices, and added to the existing ones in agreement with new security culture 
features. In addition to self-defense and national military power, various forms of 
security cooperation agreements (such as neutrality pacts, ententes, coalitions, written 
defense pacts, and formal defense alliances) have been invented in the history of 
international relations. A recent study suggests that security cooperation is primary 
concern also of the current practice of trade agreements at the region level (Powers, 
2004). In fact, this study maintains that regional security agreements are taking side 
along with other forms of security cooperation in the function of providing security to 
states. In such a perspective, the present study forwards the study of security   4
regionalism by reviewing some selected cases, and presenting a preliminary 
comparative scheme. 
Though different approaches already emerged, security regionalism is not a 
wide developed field of study. Buzan introduced the concept of regional security 
complexes to define conflict relations in geographic groups of states, but failed to 
recognize the existence of cooperation patterns and trends at the region level (Buzan, 
1991). Others classified regions as zones of peace and zones of war according to the 
level of conflict and security among the states of different areas (Singer and Wildavsky, 
1993; Kakowicz, 1998) and the relation between conflict, integration and democracy 
(Gleditsch, 2002). Adler and Barnett (1998) adopted Karl W. Deutsch’s concept of 
security community, and, largely relying on the study of the formation of the European 
security system following the so-called Helsinki Process, updated Deutsch’s approach 
according to constructivism in order to propose a model for the analysis of current 
security-building processes in regions. Also the security culture school relies on 
constructivism to study regional security cooperation in Asia and Europe (Krause, 
1993). Constructivism (Bilgin, 2005) and traditional analysis (Maoz, Landau, Malz, 
2004) have been applied to study security cooperation in the Middle East. The 
perspective of the present study is close to the security community perspective, but 
adopts the concept of regional security partnership, and proposes a descriptive model 
apt to catch the features of a large number of current security cooperation processes. 
 
Defining the object: regional security partnership 
Regional security partnership is the security arrangement of an international 
region that originates from inter-governmental consensus to cooperate on dealing with 
security threats and the enhancement of stability and peace in the region by making use 
of different types of agreements, instruments and mechanisms such as formal security 
treaties, international organizations, joint action agreements, trade and other economic 
agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and stability pacts including 
confidence-building measures, measures of preventive diplomacy, and measures dealing 
with the domestic environment. 
All the countries of a region and in some cases also extra regional powers 
compose a regional security partnership, which is based on one or few fundamental   5
agreements and a number of related operative agreements. In the fundamental 
agreement(s), the partner governments declare principles of peaceful relations, 
commitment to avoid power confrontation, sources of conflict and instability in the 
region, and the resolve to use cooperation for the management of regional security 
problems. In the fundamental agreement(s), governments agree also to create 
mechanisms needed to implement co-operation and keep the common security problems 
under control. They sign operative agreements also to create multilateral offices and 
new international organizations to deal with perceived security threats. In addition to the 
existing ones, these offices and organizations fill the function of warning about security 
threats, and carry out collective actions and policies. In such a condition, a certain 
extent of security de-nationalization and, in the long-term, also the constitution of a 
security community can emerge from the establishment of a regional security 
partnership. 
From this concept, a model of regional security partnership has been defined 
for analytical purposes (see Attinà, 2003a and 2005). It assumes that governments come 
to the agreement of co-managing security problems when (a) the countries of the region 
are aware of reciprocal interdependence and common dependence on transnational 
problems, and (b) international relations in the region are not polarized by great power 
competition. In such situation, governments put in place instruments and mechanisms of 
security co-management inspired by the principles of cooperative security - that is, 
based on exchange of information, dialogue, collaboration, and the pooling of resources 
- and comprehensive security – that is, dealing with various domestic and international 
security issues, and making use of different resources, including economic, military, 
technical, and cultural ones. Briefly, the security arrangement of the region is an 
arrangement of co-management, and all the countries contribute as partners within a 
composite framework of institutions and practices. As long as a security partnership 
develops, the security cultures and policies of the countries of the region will come 
closer to one another, and a security community can emerge. But, the current state of   6
security cooperation in concerned regions does not fill the conditions for the 
transformation of the existing practices into security communities
1.  
The main features of the model of the regional security partnership can be 
summarized as it follows. 
Pre-conditions 
•  awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local 
effects of global problems, 
•  relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region 
and restrained use of violence in international conflicts. 
Conditions 
•  consensus of the governments of the region on building security 
cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving 
international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic 
growth, 
•  no opposite military alliances. 
Structures and means 
•  written fundamental agreements, 
•  operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations, 
•  a set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict 
management and prevention, 
•  involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable). 
Consequences 
•  reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the 
countries of the region, 
•  increase of security and defence policy de-nationalization, 
•  development of security community (possible). 
 
The formulation of the model is largely based on the knowledge of the 
European case, which is the case of security partnership that came to life as the first in 
time, and presents the most developed set of instruments and practices. More precisely, 
the model has been constructed having in mind the European security partnership of the 
early Nineties. At that time, European international relations were unstable, and the 
European governments decided to overcome the uncertainties of the time by 
strengthening the positive elements of security cooperation that had been developed by 
themselves in the Helsinki Process, i.e. the principles of cooperative, comprehensive, 
                                                 
1 A security community is a group of contiguous countries bound together by high level of transaction and 
communication flows and the perception of being a community. This “we-feeling” is essential to establish 
institutions for peaceful conflict resolution that is specific of a security community (Deutsch et al. 1957).   7
and progressive security
2. However, other projects and initiatives in East Asia on the 
initiative of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Central Asia on the initiative of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Africa on the initiative of the African 
Union (namely, the Peace and Security Council of the AU), are further cases of security 
co-operation that can be analyzed with the model of regional security partnership. The 
European Union policy aimed at creating an area of stability on her borders - i.e., the 
European Neighbourhood Policy – is also a case of regional cooperation that can be 
fruitfully analysed with the tool-kit of the regional security partnership model. A further 
security cooperation process to mention as potential case of regional security 
partnership, is taking place in North-East Asia. This case is not here analysed, but a 
study (Yu, 2004) convincingly demonstrates that multilateral cooperation is taking over 
bilateral cooperative relations in promoting security management in the region. As far 
as the on-going six-party talks over the North Korean nuclear issue leads to an 
institution, and the countries involved in the region (North Korea, South Korea, China, 
Japan, Russia, and the United States) make further steps towards establishing 
instruments for the co-management of the local security issues, a cooperative security 
system could emerge in Northeast Asia. 
In the following chapters, the main aspects of the five selected cases are 
separately presented, and, subsequently, a brief comparative analysis is suggested by 
using a matrix of the five cases by the fifteen items that are the main features of the 
security partnership model. 
 
The European security partnership 
The European security partnership developed after the launching of the 
Helsinki Process in the early 1970s, and matured in the 1990s. It includes all the states 
of Europe and the non-European members of the OSCE, i.e. the United States and 
Canada. The five former Soviet countries of Central Asia and OSCE members (i.e., 
Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) can hardly be 
considered as current members of the European security system. Though formal 
members of OSCE, the security policies of these countries are tightly linked to the 
                                                 
2 The Helsinki Process led to the creation of the CSCE (Conference on security and cooperation in 
Europe), later OSCE (Organisation of security and cooperation in Europe)   8
Central Asia security complex. At the exception of Turkmenistan, they are members of 
the Central Asia security partnership project, which is presented later in this analysis. 
However, the membership of these countries in the OSCE can be seen as a case of 
overlapping of regional security arrangements, which is worth of future analysis
3. 
The fundamental agreements of the European security partnership are the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe. Many 
operative agreements have been signed within the Helsinki Process, which gave birth to 
the offices, mechanisms and activities of OCSE, former CSCE. The OSCE structure 
includes the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the office of the 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, and a good number of Mission and other Field Activities in member 
countries (Ghebali and Warner, 2001; Hopmann, 2003). The OSCE security 
mechanisms have been added to a number of security structures, organisations, and 
agreements signed by the European governments during the past fifty years. All these 
agreements and structures complement one another in carrying out the European 
security partnership. In sum, they have the function of operative agreements for the 
implementation of the governmental consensus solemnly proclaimed in the above 
mentioned fundamental agreements (Attinà and Repucci, 2004). This is the case of 
NATO and NATO’s Eastern projection mechanisms known as the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the EU’s mechanisms for military 
and civilian crisis management created within the European security and defence policy 
or ESDP, and the EU’s economic cooperation programs (such as Phare, Tacis, Cards, 
etc.) that have been launched in the Nineties to sustain the peaceful transition of the 
Eastern and Central European countries from communist to liberal-capitalist regimes. 
The European security partnership has been put to a test during the late 
Nineties, namely in the former Soviet states and the Balkans. Performance has not been 
always good, sometimes deceptive. However, the role of the security mechanisms was 
important in several cases in which the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces 
helped to restrain violence, and multilateral relief and rehabilitation programmes helped 
to restore civilian conditions in countries ravaged by internal violence. 
                                                 
3 On current OSCE action in this countries see Freire, 2005.   9
Since the late Nineties, the European security partnership has been 
challenged by new worldwide conditions of in-security. Accordingly, the European 
governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered 
by the so-called new discourse of threat and danger. To cope with the problem of 
containing the policies of governments perceived as aggressive, irrational and 
unreceptive of cooperative mechanisms, and the problem of dealing with the threats of 
terrorism, the European governments have been increasingly concerned with upgrading 
their military preparedness. This policy change has many aspects including the 
development of the ESDP for worldwide use and, in some cases, the enhancement of 
the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and 
peace. These aspects make today’s European countries’ security policies somewhat 
different from the regional security partnership of the Nineties. 
 
The East Asia security partnership 
In the present analysis, the East Asia region includes the countries of 
Southern East Asia and China. In this region, the building of security partnership started 
in 1994, at the initiative of the governments of the ASEAN countries, and is centred on 
the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF. ASEAN is party in all the initiatives for building 
security cooperation and dialogue in the East Asia region. Its leading role in regional 
security cooperation is widely recognized (See Kivimaki, 2001; Jin, 2004; Men, 2004; 
Narine, 2002).  
The creation of ASEAN in 1967 was conceived as against perceived or 
imagined threats from Maoist China under the cultural revolution. Later, it has been 
recognized as an effective instrument for enhancing economic and security cooperation 
in the region. Today, ASEAN consists of ten countries – Indonesia, Thailand, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Lao, Cambodia and Myanmar 
(former Burma). They have great differences in ideology, political system, culture, 
religion, economic development, and also security problems and concern. Vietnam and 
Lao are socialist governed states; Myanmar is run by a military regime; Cambodia, a 
former communist country, has now a mixed political structure. The political structure 
of the remaining countries is labelled as Asian democracy.    10
Created to foster economic growth and also support peace and stability in 
the region, in 1971 ASEAN proposed a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. In 1987, 
Indonesia launched the idea of a denuclearized zone in South–East Asia. Both proposals 
were difficult to implement at that time. Lastly, the project of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum was launched in 1993. A group of dialogue partners was invited to join the 
initiative. It included the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia, Japan, 
Russia, China, India, and South Korea. Today, ARF counts with 23 members. 
The security partnership model applies to ARF-centred East Asia for two 
main reasons. First, the Forum received by the consensus of the member parties the 
mission to act as a broker of peace in the region by issuing proposals concerning 
confidence building measures in order to prevent escalation of possible conflicts and 
promote negotiations between parties. The consensus of the founding parties is clearly 
stated in the First ARF Chairman's Statement, issued on 1994 in Bangkok. For this 
reason, this document is the fundamental agreement of the East Asia regional 
partnership. It defines ARF objectives as fostering constructive dialogue and 
consultation on political and security issues of common interest, and making significant 
contributions towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region so 
that resort to military means would not occur.  
Second, in harmony with the regional security partnership model, the 
member countries acknowledge two basic premises: (a) domestic and international 
factors are interconnected in bringing security and peace to the region; and (b) 
interdependence of the political, economic and social dimension must be taken into due 
account to enhance individual and common security. Such orientations became clear 
with the end of the Cold War when the activity of ARF was concentrated on proposals 
such as exchange of military information and observers, attendance at military 
manoeuvres and dissemination of information about them, participation of the members 
in the UN register for conventional arms, creation of regional training centre for 
peacekeeping operations, and sponsoring of seminars on specific security questions and 
educations. 
However, neither operative agreements have been signed nor permanent 
offices and new measures and institutions created in the region. At present, only generic 
confidence building measures, loose preventive diplomacy, and traditional practices of   11
pacific settlement of disputes and conflict resolution without proper mechanism are the 
pillars of the East Asia security partnership. In order to prevent resurgence of conflicts, 
only some traditional measures have been envisaged for the domestic environment, such 
as providing humanitarian assistance, implementing human resources development, and 
reducing tensions through education and reconciliation. It would be important that new 
measures are introduced concerning, for example, the development of an early warning 
system, which would be useful both to prevent escalation of international conflicts and 
improve regional cooperation against terrorism and trans-national crimes. In fact, the 
need of common action against non-traditional forms of in-security is strong in the East 
Asia region, which has been so far abstaining from developing cooperation in such area 
of problems. 
Serious obstacles to furthering the security partnership building process 
exist in the sovereignty area, that is, the Taiwan issue which involves also the United 
States, and the China-Japan territorial dispute on the Diaoyou Islands. However, the 
governments of the region are active in strengthening regional economic cooperation 
with a view of establishing a regional free trade area. Economic cooperation and 
security cooperation are explicitly seen as complementing each other: consolidation of 
economic ties among the countries of the region will enhance mutual understanding, 
eliminate differences, build reciprocal confidence, and promote security cooperation 
(see, for example, Jin, 2004; Men, 2004). Such an economic strategy to international 
security, which played a decisive role in Europe, could be the major characteristics of 
the “Asia-Pacific way” to regional security partnership. As a matter of fact, many 
economic cooperation initiatives are flowering in the Asia Pacific area at the present 
time.  
 
The Central Asia security partnership 
Central Asia is commonly seen as including the countries of the Caspian 
and Caucasian areas plus China and Russia. Recent developments in the Caucasian area, 
however, demonstrate that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have no important 
economic and political relations with the countries on the Eastern border, while the 
foreign relations of these countries are increasingly attracted towards the area on the 
Western border, the Black Sea and Europe. Also, in terms of security issues, the three   12
Caucasian countries have high concern for developments in the wider area surrounding 
the Black Sea. Therefore, in the present analysis, Central Asia is the area centred on the 
countries east and north of the Caspian Sea. 
The meeting of the representatives of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in Shanghai, on April 1996, is the founding event of the 
process that can give life to the Central Asia security partnership. The meeting launched 
the Shanghai Five Initiative, which turned into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) on June 15, 2001. Uzbekistan’s admission, on that occasion, brought the  number 
of SCO member states to six. Lastly, in June 2002, the heads of SCO member states 
signed the SCO Charter. This document is regarded here as the fundamental agreement 
of the Central Asia security partnership. It contains the SCO purposes and principles, 
organizational structure, form of operation, and cooperation orientation (Allison and 
Lena, 2001; Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Bakshi, 2001). In July 2005, India, Iran, and 
Pakistan added to Mongolia as observer countries to SCO. 
The main purposes of the Organisation are defined as strengthening mutual 
trust, good-neighbourliness, and friendship among the member states; developing 
cooperation in various fields (such as politics, economy and trade, science and 
technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, and environmental protection); 
maintaining regional peace, security, and stability; and promoting the creation of a new 
international political and economic order. The principles of cooperation are defined as: 
respect for the Charter of the United Nations, and the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the member states; refusal of the use and threat of use of force; 
settlement of all questions through consultations and all forms of dialogue. 
Immediately after the 1996 meeting, two operative agreements - the Treaty 
on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions, and the Treaty on Reduction of 
Military Forces in Border Regions - were signed. They contain practical measures of 
cooperation aimed at advancing confidence-building in the international domain 
(Moiseyev, 1999; Yuan, 1998). At the 1998 Almaty summit, the Shanghai Five leaders 
expressed concern for shifting interest from confidence building measures for the 
management of international conflict, to cooperation measures for dealing with religious 
extremism, ethnic separatism, and terrorism, named as “the three forces” in the SCO 
jargon. The new orientation on threats to domestic security resulted in the signature of   13
two operative agreements aimed at building cooperation for dealing with trans-national 
aspects of threats to domestic security. In fact, on June 2001, they signed the Shanghai 
Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, and one year later the 
Agreement on Counter-Terrorism Regional Structure. In August 2003, China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan held the SCO’s first and, for the time being, 
only anti-terrorism exercises. 
The signature of operative agreements has been sided with the creation of 
cooperation institutions. In January 2004, the SCO’s secretariat office was inaugurated 
in Beijing, and the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) opened in 
Tashkent. The Secretariat is the standing executive organ that provides organizational 
and technical support to implement SCO documents. The Regional Anti-Terrorism 
Structure coordinates SCO activities against terrorism, separatism and extremism. 
Beside these structures, the institutional structure of SCO consists of permanent organs, 
and the meeting mechanism. The highest organ is the Council of Heads of State, which 
meets yearly. It identifies the priority areas and basic directions of SCO activities, and 
decides on matters of internal set-up and operation, and on cooperation with other 
countries and international organizations. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
prepares the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State, which is held once a year, 
adopts the SCO budgets, and decides on cooperation in specific areas. The Conference 
of Heads of Agencies is another organ conceived to resolve specific questions of 
cooperation in specialized areas. At present, the meeting mechanism has been 
established for attorneys (or procurators) general, and ministers of defence, economy, 
commerce, transportation and culture as well as heads of law-enforcement, security, 
emergency and disaster-relief agencies. Lastly, the Council of National Coordinators is 
the management organ of routine activities. 
The creation of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure made definitively 
clear that cracking down on international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, 
illegal migration and other forms of cross-border crimes is regarded by the member 
governments as the most urgent task of the Organisation. It remains to be seen whether 
this first step, inspired by the need presently concerning SCO countries the most, will be 
the engine of the “Central-Asian way” for building an effective regional security 
partnership.   14
The two powers of the region, China and Russia, share interest in combating 
terrorism (against the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and in Chechnya, respectively), 
illicit weapons trafficking and other forms of trans-border crime. They have also 
important stakes in the development of the region’s economic cooperation. 
Furthermore, China and Russia face very similar problems and challenges in the 
domestic environment such as stabilising and mastering the market, neutralising the 
social cleavages, and balancing the interest groups that cluster around the state in the 
current phase of change. Briefly, each state is aware of the risks that internal instability 
within either country could badly effect the security of the other. For this reason, each 
state seems disposed to assist the self-strengthening process of the other (Olcott, 2000). 
In harmony with this, on 2003, the two governments framed their bilateral relationship 
in the so-called Strategic cooperative partnership.  
As to the international dimension, the prospects of cooperation are quite 
good because China and Russia view themselves as being in a 10-20 year window 
where social and economic self-strengthening take precedence over strategic politics 
(Kerr, 2005). As Wang (2005) remarks, the two countries have similar strategic thinking 
and similar strategic goals to promote a multi-polar world, and become one of the poles 
and an influential global power in the future. Lastly, a good and friendly relationship 
with Russia can ensure China peace and stability in the north and northwest regions, so 
as to concentrate itself on dealing with any eventualities across the Taiwan Strait. At the 
same time, both states have divergent and even competing interests that could lead to 
conflict if mutual suspicions of each other’s long-term political, military, and economic 
objectives is not contained by strategic reassurance and mechanisms for addressing 
disputes. At present, however, the political elites of Russia and China believe that 
whatever geopolitical challenges each country may face it will not come from the other 
as long as their present partnership endures. This attitude is exemplified by the 
successful negotiation on the demarcation of the common border that initiated with the 
above mentioned agreements in the Nineties, and has been completed in June 2005 with 
the signature of the definitive agreement. In such a perspective, SCO appears as a 
venture aimed at consolidating the principle of geopolitical stability, enlarging it from 
the relations between the two major regional countries to the multilateral relations 
dimension by including the remaining countries of Central Asia. In conclusion, there are   15
good reasons to see SCO change into the first multilateral organisation of a regional 
security partnership that, sided by existing and new security agreements, will embed 
Central Asian relations in a comprehensive security system. 
In the economic sector, the advantage of cooperation between the two 
countries is huge. Russia has abundant natural resources and is potentially a big market. 
For this reason, Russia is of great significance to China’s “go global” strategy and 
projects of revitalizing the North-East and west regions. Also Russia’s shortage of 
labour can become an opportunity for China’s export of labours service (see Wang, 
2005). On the reverse side of the coin, two pitfalls are present. First, the level of 
economic relations between the countries of the region is very low. The fast growing 
Chinese economy can increase economic flows, and overcome the restrictions of the 
present condition. But such opportunity depends on the second problem, the domestic 
conditions of the partner countries. Some positive changes in economic development 
rates are countered by persisting restrictive factors (Shi, 2005). Domestic political 
instability, authoritarianism, repression, and internal political unrest afflict Central 
Asian countries, possibly at the exception of Kazakhstan, and, as recent violence in 
Uzbekistan demonstrates, can turn the region into a crisis area and a fertile ground for 
fundamentalist movements and terrorist activities. 
Lastly, it is to remind that the United States have strong concern in the 
region. Over the last fifteen years, the American armed forces readjusted their allocation 
in Euro-Asia by retreating in the west, and advancing in the east. To counter terrorism, 
the United States increased military presence in Asia. US military bases are located in 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. China has not negative attitudes towards the anti-terrorism 
stance of American military presence in Central Asia (see, for example, Jin, 2004), but 
dislikes United States become a major player of the regional security system. Russia 
attitude, instead, is negative towards United States presence in Central Asia. According 
to Shi (2005), an all-round competition between US and Russia in Central Asia 
currently exists. It is worth to remind that the final declaration of the last meeting of the 
Council of Heads of State in Astana, July 5, 2005, after saying “we will support the 
international coalition, which is carrying out anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan”, 
called for a timetable for the US-led anti-terror coalition troops to withdraw from the 
region “as the active military phase in the anti-terror operation in Afghanistan is nearing   16
completion”. Though United States’ involvement in the SCO process is unconceivable, 
it can be expected that Washington’s influence in the region will not have destabilizing 
effects if the United States accept to play the constructive and moderate role that an 
external partner is expected to play in a regional security partnership. As the regional 
security partnership model maintains, and the two cases of Europe and East Asia 
security system demonstrate, external actors can contribute to shaping and sustain the 
rules of regional security cooperation. 
 
The projected Africa security partnership 
The African Union (AU) organization has recently produced the project of 
the largest regional security partnership. Its membership is as large as the 53 states of 
the organisation. In the past, AU took some initiatives to foster the development of 
security cooperation among the member countries, and carried out peacekeeping 
operations. However, the signature of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, on 9 July 2002, is the true founding 
stone of the formal process for building a new security system, and can be regarded as 
the fundamental agreement of the projected Africa regional security partnership. The 
process is in its very early stage, and has to prove how much able is to put into practice 
the Protocol. 
The document established the Peace and Security Council as the standing 
decision-making organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in 
Africa. The Council is mandated to create instruments for putting in place a collective 
security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to 
conflict and crisis situations in Africa. These instruments would make the Council able 
to perform the specific functions of the main institution of a regional security 
partnership, such as promotion of peace, security and stability; exercise of early warning 
and preventive diplomacy; execution of peace-making, including the use of good 
offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; implementation of peace support 
operations and intervention; execution of peace-building and post-conflict 
reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management.   17
A network of offices and structures, including the Commission, a Panel of 
the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force, and a Special 
Fund, will support the action of the Peace and Security Council. 
The seriousness of international and domestic conflicts in Africa, and the 
fragility of the economic and political conditions of many African states authorize 
cautiousness about the early operation of this project, and restraint on assessing its 
potentialities. Aware of the hugeness of such an endeavour, in July 2003, AU requested 
the European Union to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations. The European 
Union responded creating the ‘African Peace Facility’. Such an early recourse to the 
involvement of an external actor in the security building process is to take into positive 
account, but also to assess once it has been put in place. 
 
The EU-planned security partnership in the EU-neighbouring area 
On 2003, the European Union launched the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP), a programme aimed at developing a zone of prosperity and a ring of 
friends with whom the EU can enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative relations. EU 
neighbouring countries are defined as the countries on the EU borders who are not 
present and future candidates to formal EU membership. Namely, they are four Eastern 
European countries (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), ten Mediterranean 
countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and 
the Palestinian Authority), and three Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia). These countries have not been invited to join into a formal structure together 
with the EU institutions and member countries, but received the EU’s proposal to be 
partners in the European cooperation programme that the EU policy-makers defined, 
made known, redefined, and probably will update as many times as circumstances 
demand. 
Neighbouring countries are invited to take political and legislative measures 
to enhance economic integration and liberalization, and measures to promote human 
rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Besides these measures, which 
are coherent with the European view of regional security, EU’s neighbouring countries 
are explicitly invited to make steps towards regional security co-management and 
participate in initiatives aimed at improving conflict prevention and crisis management,   18
and strengthening co-operation to prevent and combat common security threats. In such 
a perspective, it is apparent that the Neighbourhood Policy approach to security consists 
of the classical concepts of the European regional security partnership of the last thirty 
years, that is, comprehensive security conceived as interdependence between the 
political, socio-economic, environmental, cultural and military dimension, and 
cooperative security conceived as the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of 
information, knowledge and expertise. 
ENP is not an EU brand new programme towards neighbouring countries. In 
fact, it has incorporated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) programme, also 
known as the Barcelona Process. In 1995, the European Union and the representatives 
of 12 Mediterranean countries convened in the Spanish town to launch that programme 
aimed at putting Euro-Mediterranean relations on a new path with the explicit goal of 
creating a free trade area in 2010 (Attinà, 2003b; Attinà and Stavridis, 2001). 
Differently from ENP, EMP has an institutional structure, which has not been cancelled 
by the EMP incorporation into the ENP. Furthermore, it developed a regional security 
cooperation project that underwent difficult and ineffective negotiation. In the late 
Nineties, the project reached the stage of discussing the draft of a Mediterranean Charter 
of Peace and Stability. But negotiation was confronted with obstacles such as the 
derailment of the Middle East Peace Process, the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies of the 
Western governments, and the Iraq and post-Iraqi war problems. Finally, it has been 
abandoned also on acknowledgement of the persisting security culture divide between 
the two shores of the Mediterranean. 
It is acknowledged that the EU initiative for building comprehensive 
cooperation, including cooperative security, in the wide region formed by all the 
European, Northern Africa, South-Western Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries, 
however ambitious it is, has not been formally rejected by any government of the 
involved countries. It must be said also that the EU has made clear that this project is a 
flexible, diversified, and multidimensional one. The EU conduct also made apparent 
that dialogue and negotiations for building common security mechanisms are not on the 
frontline of the process, but heavily depend on achievements in other cooperation 
dimensions, i.e. on the reforms needed to increasingly harmonize the economic markets 
and, eventually, the political systems of all the partner countries.   19
 
Comparison and conclusions 
The governments of Europe, East Asia, Central Asia, and Africa have put in 
place their own cooperation process with the goal of building a stable framework of 
common security. Important differences and significant similarities exist between all 
these processes. The fact that such processes are contemporary to one another, and deal 
with new practices of security cooperation suggests that security politics is undergoing a 
change in current world system, and this may reflect other changes in international 
politics, namely in great power competition and the attitudes of governments towards 
the management of security issues. On such observation, a model has been proposed for 
the study of such practices and processes moving from the empirical observation of 
some recognized cases. 
In Table 1, a preliminary comparison of the five cases is proposed by 
assessing the level of correspondence of each case to the main characteristics of the 
model of regional security partnership. 
 
Table 1: A comparison of the five case of regional security partnership 
  Europe East  Asia  Central 
Asia  Africa  EU-planned 
Neighbourhood 
Pre-conditions   
Awareness for 
interdependence  High High  High  High  High   
Restrained use of 
violence  High High Medium  Medium/low  Medium but absent 
in the M.E. 
Relaxed or no 
power competition  High Low Medium  Medium  Unclear 
Conditions   
Consensus on 
reducing 
international 
violence, improving 
international 
stability, and 
promoting peace  
High High  High Medium  Medium/low 
Consensus on 
improving domestic 
stability 
High High  High Medium Diversified 
Consensus on 
improving 
economic growth 
High High  High  High  High   
No system of 
opposite military 
alliances 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes, at the 
exception of M.E.   20
Structures and 
means   
Written 
fundamental 
agreement 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Only among EU 
and the Med 
partners 
Operative 
agreements and 
multilateral offices 
Yes No  Some  No  No 
Measures and 
mechanisms for 
international 
conflict 
management and 
prevention 
Yes No  On border 
areas  No No 
Measures and 
mechanisms for 
domestic conflict 
management and 
prevention 
Yes No  On  terrorism No  No 
Involvement of 
extra-regional 
powers 
Yes Yes  No  Yes  No 
Consequences   
Reduction of 
security culture 
difference 
Yes Uncertain  Uncertain  Uncertain  Uncertain 
Increase of defence 
de-nationalization 
Among 
EU and 
NATO 
members 
No No No  No 
Development of 
security community  Possible Uncertain  Uncertain  Uncertain  Uncertain 
 
As shown in the Table, the regions are not on the same foot at the starting 
line of the pre-condition. In all official declarations, awareness for interdependence is 
recognized as the moving reason for opening negotiations on security cooperation. 
However, violence is present in international relations and domestic politics in Africa. 
In East and Central Asia great power competition has not been overcome, but is 
moderately relaxed. In the latter, the proclaimed strategic cooperative relationship 
between China and Russia signals the good will of the parties to overcome previous 
competitive relations. In the former, China-Japan and China-US relations still have the 
taste of power politics competition. On the whole, Central and East Asia needs further 
dialogue in order to make intergovernmental consensus a consolidated feature of 
regional security cooperation. Lastly, the EU-planned neighbourhood region lacks the 
pre-condition of the restrained use of violence because of conflict in the Middle East 
and the Southern Caucasus. At the same time, it is hard to define the state of the   21
condition of relaxed or no power competition. On one hand, the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict is hiding the true nature of the United States presence in the region. Is it for the 
contingent objective of the security of Israel? or for the long term objective of ensuring 
the hegemonic power interests in the region? If the latter case is true, power politics 
competition could be avoided by bringing the United States in the number of the 
members of the security partnership building-process, an objective neglected and so far 
even opposed by the European and Arab governments in the negotiations on security 
building in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Israeli-Palestine conflict is hiding 
also the potentialities of power politics among Arab countries that would undermine 
regional security building efforts. Furthermore, on the East European side of the EU 
neighbourhood area, one must take into account the dilemma of how much the Russian 
political class and society are sincerely committed to play down traditional power 
politics in the region. 
In terms of conditions, the items of the Table show a better state in all the 
five processes. This is not contradictory with the negative state of the pre-conditions 
features. In fact, although not all pre-conditions are positively filled, as the security 
community model would request, governments decide to create co-management security 
mechanisms because they acknowledge the advantages of restraining from violence, and 
attempt to build security partnership. However, such strategy will be successful only on 
condition that also the requisites of pre-conditions are met in a non-distant future. 
In the meantime, the difficulties of fulfilling the pre-conditions requisites 
are reflected in the state of the implementation of the consensus, that is in the items of 
the third sector of the Table, which concern the capability of putting on the ground the 
structures and instruments that make the regional security partnership operative. On this 
regard, at the exception of Europe, and to a small extent of Central Asia in the specific 
areas of borders and terrorism, the remaining regions are in rather poor conditions. 
In conclusion, de-polarized world politics allows a large extent of dynamism 
at the region level in the area of security cooperation. Interdependence is the reason for 
developing regional cooperation, especially on condition that global problems concern 
the countries of the region in rather similar ways. Furthermore, cooperative and 
comprehensive security is increasingly accepted in the security culture of many states 
and societies because government have developed awareness for multidimensional   22
strategies and policies, i.e. for intervening simultaneously on the social, economic, and 
political aspects of common problems. 
In Europe, all these changes came to the surface a bit earlier than in other 
regions, and the existing circumstances made possible to form intergovernmental 
consensus on a wide range of instruments for the co-management of security problems. 
For this reason, the model of regional security partnership has been built by taking into 
account the most developed case of regional security partnership at the time of its 
highest performance, i.e., the European security system in the early Nineties. In such a 
perspective, although in other parts of the world, local circumstances influenced the 
governments in organizing different security cooperation arrangements, the model must 
not been considered as Europe-biased, but as an empirical model that can serve the 
function of guiding analysis. Finally, the model raises good research, as for example 
questions on what factors and circumstances explain the peculiarities of each case and 
the differences among the cases, and what future development can be expected from the 
circumstances existing in each region. 
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